INTRODUCTION
It has been argued that rural producer organizations (RPOs) are an effective tool for solving problems in rural areas and promoting agricultural development. The empirical evidence of the effectiveness of RPOs on serving their members is scarce at best. Most studies on collective action and social capital are in the context of maintaining natural capital and common resources (see Madrigal, Alpízar, and Schlüter 2011; Agarwal 2009 Agarwal , 2010 Meinzen-Dick et al. 2002; Meinzen-Dick, Knox, and Di Gregorio 2001; Pretty and Ward 2001; Krishna 2001) . Fewer studies analyze collective action in agricultural production, processing and marketing, and rural livelihoods. Available studies consist mainly of case studies (Berdegué 2001; Jones 2004; Hellin, Lundy, and Meijer 2007) , and a few analyze RPOs using quantitative methods (for example, Karami and Rezaei-Moghaddam 2005; Bernard, Taffesse, and Gabre-Madhin 2008; Barham and Chitemi 2009; Bernard, de Janvry, and Sadoulet 2009; Bernard and Spielman 2009) . These studies find mixed results depending on the local context in which the RPOs operate. This reflects the complexity of RPOs and the importance of accounting for the diversity and uniqueness of the conditions in which they operate for understanding how they function and the factors affecting their performance. Also, there is limited knowledge of how RPOs can best be supported and sustained. Knowledge gaps exist in three key areas: (1) the type, nature, and form of organizations that are most effective for serving their members; (2) the type of support that is best placed to assist in the formation and sustainability of RPOs; and (3) the conditions necessary for ensuring their economic viability. This paper analyzes RPOs in the postconflict setting of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where rural organizations hope to bridge the gap in public-sector provision of key productive and social services. Postconflict countries are characterized by weak government institutions and provide, as such, an interesting context in which to study RPOs. RPOs and other community-based organizations tend to have an active and leading role in promoting community development in this context. The evidence of the relationship between conflict and collective action is not clear-cut. Conflict is likely to erode trust and can lead to greater transaction costs to cooperation, especially when victims and perpetrators originate from the same communities or regions, and so may cause new acts of violence (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005; Hellin, Lundy, and Meijer 2007) . Alternatively, experience of hardship can open new opportunities of cooperation in postconflict situations, as victims or displaced populations may be more likely to contribute to collective action and help the social institutions to be rebuilt in the postconflict phase (Cramer 2006; Bellows and Miguel 2009; Voors et al. 2010; Unruh 2002) . As such, conflict may strengthen the population's willingness to participate and contribute to collective action. Understanding how conflict affects collective action generated by agricultural organizations may be particularly important for postconflict DRC, where agriculture is lagging far behind its potential.
The contributions of the paper are threefold. First, we provide new empirical evidence of internal and external conditions affecting RPO effectiveness using a novel survey dataset that has been collected exclusively for this purpose by the International Food Policy Research Institute in the DRC. Second, we test a new set of potential determinants relevant to postconflict and ethnically diverse countries, including incidence of conflict events, group composition, risk factors, and other territory-level (or county-level) factors. Third, we apply a structural equation model (SEM) to understand the functioning of RPOs. To our knowledge, this is the first quantitative analysis of RPOs in a postconflict setting. Our results suggest that a variety of factors can improve the functioning of RPOs in western DRC. Improving the organizations' governance and management capacities as well as increasing the interaction with external organizations, such as service providers, donors, or governmental agencies, seems to have a positive effect, whereas negative external events, such as conflict incidence, seem to hamper RPO performance. Whether RPOs engage with external organizations depends on a variety of factors including exposure to environmental risks, the establishment of linkages during the setup, whether they are already part of an umbrella or higher-level organization, and their size.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the DRC context from an RPO perspective. Section 3 presents the data and discusses the measures and factors affecting performance within the context of the related literature. Section 4 describes the empirical model and the econometric issues that are addressed. After Section 5 summarizes the results, Section 6 concludes.
THE DRC CONTEXT
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has huge agricultural potential, with 80 million hectares of arable land, but faces at the same time high food insecurity and severe child malnutrition. If yields were to catch up with the global technological frontier, estimates suggest that the DRC could feed around onethird of the world's population (Tollens 2004) . However, 15 years of war have devastated a great proportion of its human capital, physical infrastructure, and institutions, ranking it among the worst in development and food security indicators in the world. In 2011, the DRC was ranked last of 81 countries in IFPRI's Global Hunger Index. The DRC ranked among the last of 183 countries in providing a business-friendly environment (World Bank 2011), and also in socioeconomic development, the country was placed the last among 187 countries according to Human Development Report 2011 (United Nations Development Programme 2011). In 2007, nearly every second child younger than five in Bandundu and Bas-Congo Provinces (46 percent) and 23 percent of children in Kinshasa Province were stunted (Demographic and Health Survey 2007).
There is a growing consensus in the DRC that economic recovery and food security cannot be achieved without development in the agricultural sector. Given serious weakness in government institutions in the DRC, the country is seeking alternative service providers and a mix of approaches to deliver the needed capacity and support to the rural producers. Although there has been much excitement that producer organizations could play a leading role in the provision of agricultural and rural services and solve problems faced in rural areas, there is a dearth of empirical evidence of the functioning, capacity, and constraints of these organizations in the DRC.
Two pieces of legislation exist to guide RPO operations: (1) a 1949 decree on indigenous cooperatives, which was modified in 1956 to assign the cooperative structures to geographical coverage, and (2) a 2001 law (law 004) that provides legal provision to the establishment and operations of nonprofit organizations or associations (Ragasa, Badibanga, and Ulimwengu 2012) . Starting in 2008, the Agricultural and Rural Management Councils (Conseils Agricoles Ruraux de Gestion) were set up to provide a platform for policy dialogues and for linking RPOs with a broader set of stakeholders to improve their access to quality and useful services and support (Ragasa, Badibanga, and Ulimwengu 2011) . However, there is no empirical evidence of the implementation and enforcement of the legislation and management councils. Also, there is no assessment of how RPOs are affected, constrained, or supported by these initiatives. To date, numerous associations and organizations exist in the DRC (for example, farmer-based organization, women's organization, youth organization, local development group or committee, village association, and union or federation), but there is no inventory of existing, registered cooperatives or associations, and information about their operations is limited. Also, little is known about how RPOs can serve as effective means for service provision in rural areas and how they relate to the broader agricultural policy processes and institutional reforms in the DRC. This paper addresses this major knowledge gap about the determinants and role of collective action in agricultural development in the DRC.
DATA AND METHODS
This study uses survey data on 181 RPOs in 145 randomly selected villages in Bandundu, Bas-Congo, and Kinshasa provinces of the DRC collected from August to October 2011 using computer-assisted and mobile-based personal interviewing (see Figure 3 .1). A scoping field visit was conducted in February 2011 to test the feasibility of the questionnaire. Intensive numerators' training and pretesting in 2 villages in Bas-Congo and Kinshasa were done in July 2011. The survey is complemented by a series of key informants' interviews with producers, community leaders, international partners, and government officials to better understand the functioning of RPOs and the environment in which they operate. This survey is part of a larger study that assesses the state of agricultural extension in the DRC. There were four additional surveys (village level, Agricultural and Rural Management Councils, extension agents, and extension organizations) that were conducted as part of this larger study and that also complement this RPO survey. To implement the RPO survey, villages were first randomly selected from the three focus provinces using a procedure consistent with the one used by the National Institute of Statistics for the implementation of household surveys, so-called Enquête 1-2-3, and then interviewed all the RPOs or associations in all these sample villages, if any. About 18 percent of villages reported not having any association or organization located within them. For each RPO, a chairperson or any other knowledgeable representative was interviewed. Of the respondents to the RPO questionnaire, 60 percent were the chairpersons. The sample includes different types of RPOs, such as development associations, farmerbased organizations, women's organizations, youth groups, cooperatives, and local development committees. An interview was held with the chairperson or a knowledgeable representative of each RPO.
All sample RPOs are involved in agricultural production and marketing as their main or secondary activity. About 63 percent of the sample RPOs have proof of formal registration with a public institution, are known by local political authorities, have written membership registry and financial statements, possess a written code of conduct, provide evidence of regular internal gatherings, and have financial contributions as well as signs of active leadership. RPOs vary in size from 7 to 3,700 members. About 8 percent have 10 or fewer members, the majority (70 percent) of the RPOs interviewed have between 11 and 50 members, 13 percent have 50 to 100 members, and the rest have more than 100 members. The majority of RPOs (73 percent) were established during the past decade, and 23 percent are more than 10 years old (of which, 10 percent are more than 20 years old). Table 3 .1 presents additional descriptive statistics about the sample RPOs. 
Performance Indicators in the Literature
The focus of the paper is on measuring performance 1 of RPOs and understanding the factors explaining variation in performance across RPOs. Whether RPOs are successful depends on the purpose and reason for setting up the organization. RPOs can be categorized based on their objectives, including (1) production RPOs, which can be further categorized into production for consumption, also known as "production-oriented RPOs," or production for markets, also called "market-oriented RPOs"; (2) processing RPOs; (3) marketing RPOs; and (4) multipurpose RPOs.
2 Due to the different purposes of village organizations, there are different empirical measures of their outcomes and so their performance. Table 3 .2 summarizes the empirical evidence of the determinants of performance of RPOs and agricultural cooperatives. The table shows that several measures have been used as proxies of performance of RPOs in the literature. For instance, Bernard, de Janvry, and Sadoulet (2009) use a dummy indicator for village organizations that are active at the time of the data collection, as measured by having a development project. define performance of village organizations as the "effectiveness of servicing their members," which they measure by the percentage of members who are said to have benefited from these organizations.
Based on members' satisfaction, Karami and Rezaei-Moghaddam (2005) define performance of agricultural production cooperatives using a Likert-type scale measure. Also, in marketing performance, a set of measures has been used. Bernard and Spielman (2009) use a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if an agricultural cooperative has sold its members' output at a specific point in time. Barham and Chitemi (2009) construct a three-category marketing performance rating to evaluate market improvements caused by the project intervention based on the groups' own assessment. Bernard, Taffesse, and Gabre-Madhin (2008) use two agricultural commercialization indices to measure whether agricultural cooperatives have been beneficial to their members: (1) the household-specific crop price compared to average price received by the households in the sample and (2) the household-specific quantity of crops produced compared to average output produced and sold in the sample.
Although not primarily focused on agricultural production, the literature on natural resource management tries to explain the effectiveness of groups in pursuing joint interests in the rural public goods setting. For instance, Shiferaw, Kebede, and Reddy (2009) use aggregate indices to measure the level and success of collective action in watershed communities in Andhra Pradesh, India.
Measuring RPO Performance in the DRC Context
The RPOs in our sample constitute a comparatively homogeneous group: All RPOs are involved in agricultural production, although to varying extents, as one of their main activities. The majority of the RPOs state that agricultural production is the main area of support provided to their members. A small fraction of the RPOs provide public goods and services, such as road maintenance, bridge maintenance, public sanitation, and building canals, as their main activity. Still, these RPOs also include agricultural production, marketing, livelihood-orientated activities, or all of these as their activities. Eight cooperatives (4 percent of the sample) are multipurpose. Of the RPOs, 7 percent consist of local development committees. Key informants' interviews indicate that local development committees tend to focus on health and sanitation projects, although they can have some activities related to agricultural production and marketing.
1 This paper is a process evaluation rather than an impact assessment. It does not attempt to measure the outcome or impact of rural producer organizations (RPOs). Performance of RPOs is measured at the level of consistency of the reported objectives of the RPO setup with the actual activities and services RPOs provide to their members.
2 Production RPOs are mainly formed to facilitate access to or provide credit and agricultural inputs to their members. Processing RPOs are usually formed to support the processing of agricultural output. Marketing RPOs are typically founded to purchase agricultural output from farmers to sell it to traders or directly to final consumers. Multipurpose RPOs are those involved in one or more of the activities mentioned above and engaged at the same time in livelihood-protection activities, environmental management, or both. See Ragasa, Badibanga, and Ulimwengu (2012) for more details about these types of RPOs. We use the following measures to indicate RPO performance: whether the RPO has facilitated or provided inputs, technical advice, training, or information about agricultural production and marketing, credit, and marketing or processing of agricultural produce. Table 3 .3 summarizes the fraction of RPOs by the type of agricultural services they provide. Despite pursuing relatively homogeneous objectives, the table shows divergence in the RPOs' provision of agricultural services to their members. Half of the RPOs have facilitated group marketing, more than a third have facilitated or provided inputs, more than a quarter have facilitated or provided technical information about agricultural production and marketing, and only 1 percent have facilitated credit to their members. About 29 percent of RPOs reported not having facilitated access or provided any of these four services. The variation in performance measures across the sample RPOs provides a basis for analyzing and understanding differences in their structure, functioning, and capacity. Table 3 .4 summarizes indicators used to explain RPO performance in related studies. These factors can be grouped into (1) governance and management, (2) group composition, (3) membership commitment, (4) external linkage and support, and (5) community and agroecological factors. To measure governance and management, we use principal components analysis to create various indices.
Factors Affecting Performance
3 In particular, we use an index for formal rules and legal personality, an index for participatory decisionmaking, a dummy variable indicating whether management training was received, an index of internal interactions among members and management, and an index of family influence in decisionmaking. Appendix Table A .1 shows the scoring coefficients used in the models. To measure group composition, we use the size of membership and indices representing the proportion of women and youth in membership and leadership as well as the ratio of the number of ethnicities and religions among RPO members as a function of RPO size. For membership commitment, we use the membership fee and a dummy variable if labor and land contribution were received by the RPO. Barham and Chitemi (2009) show insignificance Source: Authors' compilations based on studies cited above. Notes: CO = community-oriented organization; MO = market-oriented organization; + = positive effect; -= negative effect.
Borrowing from the social capital and social network literature, we measure external linkages and support by a binary indicator for the existence of any external interaction in the year prior to survey collection, external support during setup and registration, and an indicator for membership in higher-level umbrella organizations. Eight other binary indicators were used to capture the presence of interaction or meeting with specific grouping of external actors -(1) staff or agricultural monitors from the Ministry of Agriculture; (2) other RPOs; (3) local political authority; (4) NGOs; (5) church-based organizations; (6) universities and colleges; (7) agricultural research institute; and (8) private companies and agribusiness firms -but results of the regression models were consistent and are therefore not reported. We also analyze the correlation between external linkages and factors that may affect them, such as whether RPO members are also members of umbrella or apex organizations, whether the RPO received help during setup, RPO formal rules, female participation in membership, market proximity, and environmental risk.
For community and agroecological factors, we use several measures. We include the number of conflict events from 1997 to 2010 in the proximity of the RPO. 4 We define proximity as a two-hour travel time distance from the center of the village where the RPO is located to the location of the reported conflict event. Our travel time estimates are based on the time required to travel 1 kilometer over the transport network as well as over off-road surfaces and are based on Uchida and Nelson (2010) . Conflict events are defined as, among other things, battles, riots, protests, violence against civilians, and nonviolent transfer of territory (county). Table 3 .5 provides further details and summary statistics about the conflict measures used. Conflict may be affected by collective action or the performance of large and influential RPOs. If unobserved factors, such as the collective spirit in a given village or group of villages in a given territory, are correlated with conflict incidence and also affect RPO performance, our parameter estimate of conflict will be biased. We think our results do not suffer from endogeneity for two reasons. First, the conflict data we use are measured prior to the time of the collection of the survey (that is, 1997-2010), and our 4 The data on conflict events is taken from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED). Conflict events are collected for the time from January 1997 to December 2010. ACLED is designed for disaggregated conflict analysis and crisis mapping. This dataset codes the dates and locations of all reported political violence events in more than 50 developing countries. Political violence includes events that occur within civil wars or periods of instability. Although civil war occurrence is decreasing across African countries, new forms of political violence are becoming more common. ACLED is directed by Professor Clionadh Raleigh (Trinity College Dublin). It is operated by senior research managers Andrew Linke (University of Colorado) and Caitriona Dowd (Trinity College Dublin). Senior research analysts Annie Ngwira, Charles Vannice, and Olivia Russell oversee regional coding (http://www.acleddata.com/about-acled/). performance indicator variables recall service provision during the past year. Given the chronological order of events, it is unlikely that our measures of RPO performance can affect (reduce or increase) the likelihood of conflict events. Second, conflict events in our dataset are large-scale (territory-level or district-level) events. We believe that the RPOs in our sample are too small to influence conflict occurrence at this level.
We also use other conflict indicators, such as the Euclidean distance in kilometers to the conflict event, that is, the shortest distance as measured by a straight line from the RPO village to the location of the reported conflict event; 5 the decaying time, which assumes that conflicts of more recent years have greater effects than those of earlier years on RPO performance; and the number of conflict events per territory and per district.
To measure environmental risk, we include a measure of rainfall variability. This is the average standard deviation of the rainfall in a given territory during the past 50 years. To capture access to markets, we use a measure of travel time to the nearest city within the territory (adjusting for the varying travel time with or without roads using various Geographic Information System interfaces).
EMPIRICAL MODEL
Measuring the performance of RPOs is difficult given the diversity of organizations and objectives. There is often no single aggregate measure of performance that would allow one to measure performance in a satisfactory way. Although some studies have used a single measure based on RPO members' subjective satisfaction of performance, this approach can be problematic as subjective performance measures may deviate from the organizations' actual performance.
Given these problems, in this paper, performance, or the collective capacity of an RPO, is described as a latent variable that is reflected by various indicator variables. Although we observe whether the RPOs in the sample provide different services to their members, an RPO that has a high collective capacity will be high performing in the provision of agricultural services, but we do not observe performance or collective capacity directly in the data. Performance is related to other variables, such as the governance structure and characteristics of the organization and the environment in which the RPO operates, which may be related to a further set of variables. A statistical model that allows one to model performance in this complex setup is SEM. SEMs are multivariate regression models that combine elements of analysis of variance and factor analysis (Fox 2002) . They can be used to examine the effects of both manifest (observed) and latent (unobserved, inferred) variables (Hox and Bechger 1998; MacCallum and Austin 2000) , both of which can be either exogenous or endogenous. SEM is an especially useful method where Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis is impossible because multidirectional causality among variables violates the assumption of zero covariance between the residual and the independent variable (Fox 2002) .
SEM consists of two parts: a measurement model and a structural model. The measurement model describes the relation between the indicator variables and the latent variables using factor analysis. SEM analyzes the covariance structure of the data. When all variables are continuous, SEM employs confirmatory factor analysis to estimate the factor loadings in the measurement model. The factor loadings measure the relation between the factor and the indicators and are similar to the coefficients in a regression model but for the factor's not being observed. The structural model relates the latent variables to each other and to covariates using path analysis.
SEM can be specified using a path diagram. The square boxes represent the observed variables and ellipses the latent variables. Arrows indicate the paths and imply causation. Double arrows indicate covariance. A path diagram for our model can be written as in 
Structural Model
For translating the path diagram into an empirical model, we denote for each RPO i = 1, … , 181, performance as and write
The vector x i comprises RPO-, location-, and territory-specific factors explaining performance; is a constant, and is an idiosyncratic error term.
Measurement Model
Our model has three indicators for the latent dependent variable. Indicator 1 captures whether the RPO provided inputs, 2 indicates whether joint marketing of members' products was facilitated, and
For identification purposes, the factor loading of the input indicator is fixed to 1, so 1 = 1. Our results do not hinge on this choice.
Arranging all indicators in a single vector y, we can rewrite the model:
The parameters to be estimated can be grouped into the following categories: = � , , � with five parameter estimates, = ( , ) with 15, and = ( 2 , 3 ) with 2.
A key difference to a standard SEM is that all indicator variables are categorical. Confirmatory factor analysis assumes the data follows a multivariate normal distribution, which is violated with categorical indicator variables (see Kupek 2006 for a review).
This paper uses Stata's "sem" and "GLLAMM" (Generalized Linear Latent and Mixed Models) commands for estimation. Stata's sem command allows adjusting the covariance structure for binary variables using asymptotic distribution free estimators. However, this requires a sample size that exceeds the number of RPOs in our sample. For this command, we report, in addition to the sem results, simulated results based on the sample distribution of the data, but adjusting the correlation matrix for tetrachoric correlations between the binary indicator variables. GLLAMM allows modeling binary variables. In this case, the continuous latent response * , with j = 1, 2, 3, can be related to the observed binary indicator variables via a threshold model (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2004 ; Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, and Zheng 2011) where
Results from these two approaches are compared. Given our sample size, we also report Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations for the three indicator variables for comparison purposes. For this specification, bootstrapped standard errors are reported. The SURE model does not account for unobserved collective capacity or performance that may cause variation in the indicator variables. In this model, the covariates are directly related to the indicator variables. Table 5 .1 summarizes the results of the structural equation model (SEM) using different estimation methods. The performance indicators are positively correlated with each other, which provides evidence for an underlying latent variable construct. The results suggest the model fits the data comparatively well, as the likelihood ratio test of comparing our models to a model that perfectly fits the data does not show significant differences. Also, the root mean square error of approximation, likelihood ratio test, Akaike's information criteria, and R-square statistics suggest a decent model fit. (1) and (2) of the main text. SEM = structural equation model; GLLAMM = generalized linear latent and mixed models; SURE = seemingly unrelated regression equations. Dashes indicate not applicable Bold and italic type indicates goodness-of-fit of the models a Columns 1 and 2 report model estimates using Stata's sem command. Model 2 adjusts the correlation matrix for tetrachoric correlation between the indicator variables and uses summary statistic data to fit the model. b Column 3 reports model estimates using GLLAMM. c Linear probability model results are reported. Column 4 reports results for input, column 5 for advice, and column 6 for markets. Bootstraped standard errors are in parenthesis. d Defined as presence of interaction or meeting with any external actor in the past year (2010) e Model versus saturated denoted. *p < .1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
RESULTS
Across all model specifications, the provision of advice y2 explains much of the RPOs' performance. In particular, increasing performance by one unit is expected to increase the likelihood of providing advice to the members by about 0.8 in the first two model specifications. In the GLLAMM model, the estimates suggest that a unit change in performance will increase the advice, y2, by 0.9. The factor loadings can be interpreted as the coefficients in a regression model. For instance, increasing collective capacity or RPO performance by one unit increased the likelihood of marketing members' input by 0.57 (column 3) and 0.76 (column 2).
Governance and Management
Formal rules increase performance, but this effect is significant at a 10 percent significance level in the GLLAMM model. RPOs with strong formal rules are also more likely to provide inputs to their members. This might be because formal rules suppress corruptive tendencies and as such RPOs with strong formal rules may be more likely to acquire inputs for their members. In-depth interviews suggest that registration enables RPOs to work on projects by international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and donors and helps them interact with other organizations and associations at higher levels. These interviews also suggest that RPOs that are not registered were susceptible to harassment and undue fees by local authorities.
We do not find any effect of different types of decisionmaking (participatory versus top-down) on performance, which is in contrast to other studies (Attwood and Baviskar 1987; Bernard and Spielman 2009) . However, we find that management training has a positive effect on performance and increases the probability of the RPO's providing advice and marketing to its members, but does not directly affect the provision of inputs. This finding is consistent with key informant interviews that suggest that lack of management and organizational skills is a major constraint for RPO performance. The results are consistent with several studies, highlighting the role of strong leaders to provide technical expertise, drive, and continuity on organizations (for example , Tendler 1983; Bianchi 2002; Salifu, Francesconi, and Kolavalli 2010) .
Close social relations within the group may hinder the leadership's capacity to enforce rules of sanctions due to group pressure (Hellin, Lundy, and Meijer 2007) , which may hinder group effectiveness. Alternatively, close family ties within the group may foster solidarity and familiarity among members and may, as such, facilitate collective action. However, we do not find evidence that the existence of intragroup family ties affect RPO performance in the DRC in a significant way.
Membership Composition and Heterogeneity
The literature on the effect of group heterogeneity on collective action is mixed. Higher management and transaction costs as well as complementarity of skills, ideas, and resources and diversification of risks are associated with more heterogeneous groups. Some studies suggest that heterogeneous RPOs may be weaker (for example, Agarwal 2010) and that social homogeneity can increase credibility and trust within the group (Ratner et al. 2010) , which can reduce management costs and can facilitate group cooperation (Bernard, de Janvry, and Sadoulet 2009) .
RPOs' group composition is heterogeneous in the DRC context. On average, there are three distinct religious affiliations and four distinct ethnicities of members in a single organization. Women constitute about half of RPO members and a third of RPO leaders.
6 However, we do not find any measure of group heterogeneity to be statistically relevant in explaining variations in RPO performance. 7 We also included the age composition of the group members as a further dimension of heterogeneity into our analysis. Youth, defined as group members' being aged 18 to 35, 8 represents 42 percent of RPO members and 20 percent of RPO leaders. The strong representation of the young in RPOs might reflect the strong emphasis on organizing youth by the dominant political party from 1965 through 1990. This led to the creation of various youth committees such as those for agriculture and security, among others. This historical emphasis on youth is reflected in the prominence of youth groups in the villages. In the 145 villages surveyed, youth organizations seem to be the most frequent and most prominent type of organizations. However, we find that controlling for a variety of territory-and RPOspecific effects, increasing the number of youth is not a statistically significant factor in explaining external linkages and RPO performance in service provision.
Membership Commitment
Although membership composition and heterogeneity were found to have no significant effect on performance, membership commitment, measured by the financial contributions of the members, appears to be a strong and positive predictor of performance (see also Meinzen-Dick 2009 and Cook and Chambers 2007) . Interesting to note, about 80 percent of RPOs in our sample collect financial contributions from their members, which provide an average monthly contribution of CF 1,400, about US$1.50, or the daily wage of a government extension agent (Ragasa, Badibanga, and Ulimwengu 2012) .
External Linkages and Support
We find that the greater the interaction of RPOs with other organizations (including other RPOs, NGOs, government agencies, extension agents, research institutes, and others), the greater is the likelihood of agricultural support services' being provided to RPO members. The interaction with external organizations increases RPO performance in the SEM and GLLAMM models. The GLLAMM model increases the coefficient on external interaction but also reduces the precision of the estimate, which may be due to our sample size. Interacting with external organizations also increases directly the probability of providing inputs and advice by 17 percent, but there is no direct effect of external interaction on marketing of outputs. These findings are consistent with other studies Karami and Rezaei-Moghaddam 2005) .
We also find that external assistance during setup increases RPO performance and also increases directly the probability of providing marketing services (column 6, Table 5 .1). This is consistent with a general consensus in the literature that collective action may as well not emerge at all in the absence of external interventions (Varughese and Ostrom 2001) . The widespread lack of capacity and high levels of illiteracy among the rural population in the DRC may make external assistance in setting up groups, raising community awareness, and mobilizing collective action central for the performance and viability of these RPOs.
The tendency of RPOs to link to external actors is positive correlated with the environmental risk they are facing, their affiliation with umbrella or national-level organizations, and the size of their membership (Table 5 .2). The more risky the environment, the more likely the RPO has external linkages, which may reflect risk-coping and management strategies. RPOs that are members of umbrella or higherlevel organizations are more likely to interact and link with other stakeholders, NGOs, and donors than those that are not members. As the size of an RPO increases, the likelihood of interaction with other organizations and stakeholders increases. This may be because of greater membership linkages or better organizational capacity. 
Community and Agroecological Factors
The three provinces in the DRC from which our data are drawn were not severely hit by wars and riots during past years compared to the eastern part of the country. However, there is great variation in the incidence of conflict events across villages and territories in these three provinces. The frequency of conflict events in the proximity of RPOs is negatively correlated with performance in agricultural service provision among RPOs. The inclusion of the conflict measure reduces the effect of the formal governance systems on RPO performance. This can be interpreted to mean that the capacity of formal governance to promote RPO performance is restricted by the broader environment in which the RPOs operate. The precision of our parameter estimates varies by the method we use. Conflict reduces performance in SEM, but the strength of the variable decreases once we have accounted for the binary nature of the indicator variables. Given our small sample size, adjusting the measurement model for the binary indicators increases substantially the standard errors of the estimates, and the significance level falls to 5 (column 3, Table 5 .1) and to a 12 percent level (column 2, Table 5 .1). Although not significant, conflict also decreases the probability of providing services (columns 4 to 6, Table 5 .1). Table 5 .3 summarizes the SEM results using different measures of conflict. First, we assign weights to the conflict variable so to give more weight to closer conflict events. The results are consistent with the proximity measure used previously. Second, we restricted the number of conflict events to those within one-hour proximity, instead of two-hour proximity, but this variable is not significant. This may be majority of the RPOs have no conflict events within an hour's radius. Third, we model conflict proximity with Euclidean distance both without weights and with decaying weight function, which are both not significant. In the DRC, where roads are nonexistent and mountains and difficult terrain are dominant in many rural areas, Euclidean distance does not seem to adequately capture closeness to conflict events. Fourth, we use the number of conflict events within the RPO territory both without weights and with time-decaying function-that is, more recent conflict events are given more weight-and find again that this is not a significant determinant of RPO performance. Distinguishing nonviolent conflict from only violent conflict events does not alter our results. Other covariates include the levels of development and infrastructure, which are likely to affect transaction costs and the ability to interact with service providers and other actors. Small cooperatives and those based in areas with high potential for agricultural production are typically socioeconomically betteroff (Francesconi and Heerink 2009 , Bernard and Spielman 2009 , and Bernard, Taffesse, and GabreMadhin 2008 . In the DRC, proximity to markets and the level of development, using distance to travel to the nearest market as a proxy, are not statistically significant in affecting the performance of RPOs.
9 In other words, RPO performance is not systematically different for those that are located far from or close to urban areas and large markets.
Empirical evidence of environmental risk suggests a positive correlation with collective action (Thompson and Wilson 1994; Bernard, de Janvry, and Sadoulet 2009; ). We do not find that performance is directly affected by environmental risk. Rather we find that environmental risk increases interactions with external actors, which in turn affects performance.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents empirical evidence of the role of rural producer organizations (RPOs) and the determinants of their performance within a postconflict and fragile environment.
We find that various factors affect service provision and the operations of RPOs in western DRC. In particular, we find that conflict affects the performance of these organizations, but our results hinge on the measure of conflict chosen. Although there is great hope that RPOs are able to bridge the gap in service provision due to weak institutions in fragile states, there is no guarantee that they are able to do so. RPOs need an enabling environment, good governance, and security to perform well and benefit their members as they are expected to do. Understanding sources and causes of conflict and addressing them is crucial for specifying agricultural and rural development strategies in postconflict and fragile environments.
The greater the interaction with external actors, the greater is the likelihood that services and information are provided to members through the RPOs. This finding suggests that there is a need for greater recognition of the importance of linking with other actors that are potential sources of services, information, technical support, and market outlets. Policies and investments to help RPOs link more to each other and to other organizations and service providers are critical.
Strong organizational governance and management systems are positively correlated with RPO performance. Especially in the context of weak capacity and institutions in fragile states, external support during setup appears crucial for performance, and it also increases an RPO's capacity to link to external actors. Management and organizational training among RPOs' key officials can be an important strategy for supporting these RPOs.
Membership commitment is strongly and positively correlated with performance. Awareness raising among RPO members and management of the importance of financial contributions and capacity building for financial and organizational management are important strategies.
More research is important to understand the costs and benefits of supporting and promoting these RPOs and the type and timing of support they need. Measures of performance used in this paper are the accounts of leaders or representatives of RPOs. This study could be complemented by information collected about the satisfaction or accounts from members about the value or effectiveness of RPOs. Follow-up studies using in-depth qualitative assessment of selected RPOs will be useful in identifying how members benefit from these organizations and what the costs and difficulties are in sustaining collective action. Assessment studies on the impact of RPOs on their members' incomes, food and nutrition security, and welfare are other areas for future research. 
23

APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLE
Family influence in management
.636
Family influence in membership
Proportion of female on management (%)
.581 .087 .122
Proportion of female on membership (%)
.533 .032 .035 
Proportion of youth on management (%)
.095 -.036 .656
Proportion of youth on membership (%)
.031 .009 .591
Source: Raw data from IFPRI (2011) survey. Notes: RPO = rural producer organization. a Dummy variable unless otherwise indicated.
